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The doctrine of fair use allows unauthorized copying of original works of art,
music, and literature for limited purposes like criticism, research, and education,
based on the rationale that copyright holders would consent to such uses if bar-
gaining were possible. This paper develops the first formal analysis of fair use
in an effort to derive the efficient legal standard for applying the doctrine. The
model interprets copies and originals as differentiated products and defines fair
use as a threshold separating permissible copying from infringement. Applica-
tion of the analysis to several key cases (including the recent Napster case) shows
that this interpretation is consistent with actual legal reasoning. The analysis also
underscores the role of technology in shaping the efficient scope of fair use.
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 Copyright protection gives authors, artists, and composers an incentive to create 
original works by giving them exclusive control over the right to make copies.  While this 
right overcomes the appropriability problem associated with intellectual property (owing 
to its public good nature), it also creates a distortion arising from the copyright holder’s 
monopoly power.  The limited duration of copyrights is one way that the law seeks to 
balance these offsetting effects (Landes and Posner, 1989).  Another is by application of 
the fair use doctrine.  Originally established by the Copyright Act, fair use allows 
unauthorized copying for limited purposes like criticism, scholarship, news reporting, and 
education based on the rationale that copyright holders would consent to such uses if 
bargaining were possible.  In this sense, the allowed uses pass a “market test” for 
efficiency and should be permitted, subject to the constraint that they do not substantially 
impair the copyright holder’s incentive to create the work in the first place (Gordon, 
1982).   
 Technological advances, however, continually challenge courts to adapt the fair 
use standard to changing circumstances (Adesltein and Peretz, 1985). At the same time, 
scholars continue to disagree about the extent to which intellectual property should be 
granted any special legal protection.1  The fair use doctrine is at the heart of this debate, 
for it defines the threshold between legal copying and infringement.   
                                                          
1 See, for example, Boldrin and Levine (2002), Klein, Lerner, and Murphy (2002), and Depoorter and 
Parisi (2002). 
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The purpose of this paper is to develop a formal economic model of fair use in an 
effort to shed light on this debate. Although not the first economic analysis of fair use, 
this paper contains the first formal treatment.2 The model treats the original work and 
copies as differentiated products lying on a continuum, and interprets fair use as a 
threshold separating permissible copying from infringement.  The optimal threshold 
balances the social benefits of the use against the cost to the copyright holder (a Hand test 
for fair use).3 We argue that such a model is useful both for understanding how the law 
has applied the doctrine in previous cases, and how technological change is likely to 
affect its future application.   
2. The Model  
The model will highlight both the differential in costs between originals and 
copies, and the fact that copies are generally not perfect substitutes for the original, 
depending on the quality and extent of the copy.  The cost differential is a supply-side 
issue that relates to the copying technology.  As that technology improves, the marginal 
cost of producing a copy approaches that of the original.  For example, photocopies of a 
book are cheaper to produce than are handwritten copies, and downloading music from 
the internet is easier than recording it off the radio.  This technological aspect of the 
copyright issue can be isolated by treating the original and copies as homogeneous goods 
(perfect substitutes) but with different marginal costs of production.   
Such a model, however, ignores the demand-side issue relating to the nature or 
content of the work itself, apart from its cost of production.  To capture this, we suppose 
                                                          
2 See Gordon (1982), Landes and Posner (1989), and Depoorter and Parisi (2002).  Landes and Posner 
develop a formal model of copyright but only treat fair use as one application.      
3 See U.S. v. Carroll TowingCo., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), which develops a cost-benefit test for 
negligence. 
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that there is some underlying “good” that comes in different varieties or versions.  At one 
extreme is the original work, while copies of differing quality or extent lie along a 
continuum.  Some consumers will place the highest value on the original in its entirety, 
while others will be satisfied with inferior quality copies or with portions of the original.  
Consider, for example, a specialized textbook.  Practitioners in the field will likely attach 
the highest value to the published version of the book, while students and those with a 
more limited interest may be satisfied with a photocopy of pertinent parts of it.  This 
aspect of the problem is best captured by treating the original work and copies as 
differentiated products, and by assuming that consumers differ in their valuations of 
various versions of the underlying good.  The most workable such model is the spatial 
model of differentiated products, which we adopt here.4   
Specifically, assume consumers are distributed uniformly on the unit interval, 
with locations indexed by z∈[0,1].  We arbitrarily locate the original work at z=1.  
Assume that the author can produce units of the original at a constant marginal cost of c 
after incurring a fixed cost of creation, F.  (We discuss the cost of producing copies of the 
original below.)  Consumers purchase at most one unit of the original and derive gross 
benefits of v per unit.  They also incur a “transport cost” of (1-z)t, where t is the unit cost 
of transportation.  This transport cost is an aspect of consumer preferences and reflects 
the different valuations consumers attach to the various versions of the underlying good.  
For example, a consumer at z values the original at v−(1−z)t, which is decreasing as z is 
farther away from one. 
                                                          
4 See, for example, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, pp. 396-400). 
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The total cost of purchasing the original work at a price p is thus p+(1-z)t for a 
consumer located at z.  Given the option of purchasing one unit of the original or 
purchasing nothing, a consumer at z will make the purchase if v>p+(1-z)t, or if 
   z > 1 − (v-p)/t ≡ zM(p) .     (1) 
If we normalize the measure of consumers to be one, then the demand for the original (in 
the absence of copying) is 1−zM(p), which is downward sloping in p.  (See Figure 1.)  The 
author/producer, acting as a monopolist, will therefore choose the price to maximize 
profit, given by 
   π = (p−c)(1−zM(p)),      (2) 
which yields the monopoly price 
   pM = (v+c)/2.       (3) 
Substituting this price into (1) yields the equilibrium threshold between consumers and 
non-consumers 
   zM = 1 − (v−c)/2t.      (4) 
(That is, consumers on z≥zM purchase the original while those on z<zM do not.)  The 
author will find it profitable to create the work if the maximized value of variable profit 
exceeds the fixed cost F.  We assume that this is true when the author has a monopoly 
over the right to copy the original.  That is, we assume that πM>F, where πM is the 
maximized value of (2). 
A. The Impact of Copying 
 Now assume that it is technologically possible for consumers to make copies of 
the original and that it is legal to do so. (Entry of competing firms, however, remains 
illegal.)  Specifically, suppose that a consumer at location z can “self-produce” his or her 
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“ideal version” of the good at a cost of ccz.5   An exact copy of the original would 
therefore cost cc (given z=1). Thus, we assume that cc>c, reflecting scale economies 
enjoyed by the author-producer, as well as expertise, experience, etc.  (Technological 
improvements over time, however, will likely cause cc→c.)  Self-producing an ideal 
version of the good is potentially beneficial for a consumer at location z if v≥ccz.  We 
therefore say that consumers with z ≤ v/cc ≡ zc are potential copiers in the sense that they 
would rather make a copy than not consume the good at all.  We assume hereafter that 
v<cc, or that zc<1, implying that consumers with z near one would never make copies.  
(This assumption is inessential, however, and would obviously fail to hold if cc becomes 
small enough).6 
 Given that copying is feasible and legal, consumers now have three options: 
purchase the original, make a copy of their ideal version of the good, or not consume the 
good at all.  Figure 2 shows a situation where each option is chosen by a subset of 
consumers.  Specifically, those with z∈[0,zc] make a copy, those with z∈(zc,zM) do not 
consume, and those with z∈[zM,1] buy the original.7  This situation occurs if zc<zM.  In 
this case, potential copiers do not overlap with the monopolist’s market, so copying has 
no effect on the monopolists’ strategy, and hence does not infringe on his profit.  
Consequently, he should not object to such uses.  The situation is different, however, 
when zc>zM, for now potential copiers overlap with potential purchasers.  This case will 
arise when the technology of copying improves sufficiently.  At that point, all consumers 
                                                          
5 We assume that a consumer would never self-produce anything but his or her ideal version of the good.  
6 The basic conclusions are unaffected if cc≤v. 
7 We assume that when indifferent, consumers either copy or buy the original rather than refrain from 
consumption.  Below we assume that when indifferent between buying the original and making a copy, 
consumers buy the original. 
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will either make copies or purchase the original, depending on which involves a lower 
cost.   
 If the price of the original is p, a consumer at location z will buy the original if 
p+(1-z)t≤ccz, or if 




+ ,      (5)  
and make a copy otherwise (assuming no legal limit on copying).  (See Figure 3.)  
Demand for the original in this case is therefore 1− )(ˆ pz , and the author’s problem is to 
set the price to maximize 
   π = (p−c)(1− ))(ˆ pz .      (6) 
This yields the equilibrium price 
   pˆ = (cc+c)/2,       (7) 
and threshold 








2 .      (8) 
Comparing (3) and (7) shows that pˆ  > pM given cc>v.  However, the author’s profit must 
be less than it was under the pure monopoly outcome.  As a result, copying is now 
harmful to the author, creating the possibility that the author will not be able to cover his 
fixed cost of creation.  Indeed, it is easy to show that the author’s variable profit (the 
maximized value of (6)) is increasing in cc, which implies that as cc falls (i.e., as the 
technology of copying improves), the author’s variable profit decreases because more 
consumers find it desirable to self-produce the good.  (This assumes no corresponding 
decrease in c.)  If profit falls below F, the author’s incentive to create the original is 
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eliminated.  This is the basis for legal protection of copyright.  At the same time, we have 
seen that copying by consumers who would not have purchased the original anyway is 
non-harmful to the author.  And because it confers a social benefit, it represents the basis 
for the fair use limitation on the author’s copyright according to Gordon’s (1982) 
standard.  Below, we derive the optimal extent of fair use in the presence of this trade-off.  
First, however, we need to examine in detail how a fair use limitation affects the pricing 
strategy of the author. 
B. Fair Use  
 Fair use represents a limit on the author’s copyright by allowing some copying 
(self-production).  We capture this formally by defining z  as the upper bound on 
allowable copying.  That is, z< z  is fair use, but z≥ z  is not.  This is consistent with the 
interpretation of z as an index of how close the copy is to the original.  For example, fair 
use allows “partial copies” (book excerpts or limited photocopying for personal use) but 
does not allow nearly complete copies.  In terms of the model, fair use protects the 
author’s monopoly power over the range [ z ,1], but forces him to share the market with 
copiers over the range [0, z ).  Given this characterization of fair use, we first examine the 
optimal pricing policy of the monopolist as a function of z .  Later, we derive the socially 
optimal extent of fair use. 
 Clearly, for z ≤zM, the author will adopt the monopoly pricing strategy derived 
above since only non-harmful copying is allowed. As noted, fair use has no effect on the 
behavior of the author in this range.  This changes, however, as z  is raised above zM, for 
now, potential copiers overlap with potential purchasers of the original. Since the author 
retains monopoly power over the range [ z ,1], it is initially optimal for him to set the 
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price so that all consumers in this range just find it desirable to continue purchasing the 
original, while all those who can legally make copies do so.  Thus, the fair use constraint 
is binding.  The profit-maximizing price under this strategy extracts all the surplus from 
the marginal purchaser, so p+(1− z )t = v, which yields 
   p  = v − (1− z )t.      (9) 
(See Figure 4.)  The resulting level of variable profit is 
   π( z ) = ( p −c)(1− z ).      (10) 
After substituting from (9), we have  





−[v−(1− z )t−c] + (1− z )t. 
Using (3) and (9), we can show that this derivative is negative if and only if 
   pM < p ,       (11) 
which clearly holds for z >zM.  Thus, the author’s profit is decreasing in z  in the relevant 
range, even though the price is increasing.  Of course, this makes sense, since an increase 
in the extent of fair use beyond zM erodes the author’s monopoly power and hence his 
profit. 
 As z  continues to increase, causing profit to fall further below the unconstrained 
monopoly level, a point may be reached where the author no longer finds it profitable to 
set the monopoly price.  Instead, he may lower the price in order to attract some 
consumers who can legally make copies.  If such a point is reached for z <1, fair use 
ceases to be a binding constraint, and the optimal price, as derived above, is pˆ .  The 
switch point occurs when the profit in (10) equals the maximized value of the profit in 
(6), or when 
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   ( p −c)(1− z ) = ( pˆ −c)(1− zˆ ).     (12) 
To see where this point occurs, recall that Mpp >ˆ given c
c>v.  Thus, as p rises above pM, 
it eventually equals pˆ . This situation is shown in Figure 5.  Since it must be true that 
zz >ˆ at this point, the monopoly profit is larger. As z  continues to increase, however, it 
eventually equals zˆ .  It should also be apparent from Figure 5 that pp ˆ> at this point (as 
indicated by the dashed lines), which implies that the monopoly profit remains larger.  
The switch point must therefore occur at =z z′> zˆ  (if it occurs at all for z <1).   
 Figures 6 and 7 graph the author’s variable profit and optimal price as a function 
of z  for the case where z′<1.  As the analysis above showed, there are generally three 
ranges.  In the first range, where z ∈[0,zM], the author sets the monopoly price pM and 
earns maximum profits.  Fair use copying in this range is non-harmful to the author and 
therefore poses no threat to his incentive to create the work (given our assumption that 
the unconstrained monopoly profit exceeds F).  In the second range, where z ∈[zM,z′], the 
fair use limit is binding, causing the price to increase above pM and profits to fall. 
Allowable copying in this range is harmful to the author and will result in non-creation of 
the work if variable profit falls below the fixed cost F.   
 Finally, in the third range, where z ∈[z′,1], the fair use limit is sufficiently liberal 
that it ceases to be a binding constraint. Here, the author lowers the price of the original 
to compete with copiers.  Since profits are no longer affected by increases in z , this case 
places a lower bound on the monopolist’s profit (given the copying technology as 
embodied in cc).  Thus, if variable profits in this case exceed F, then legal prohibition of 
copying (self-production) is not needed to induce creation of the work.  Copyright 
protection may nevertheless be needed, however, to prevent entry of competing firms that 
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would enjoy the same technological advantages that the author has over mere copiers (as 
captured by the fact that c<cc). 
3. Welfare analysis 
 The preceding analysis characterizes the monopolist’s optimal reaction to 
different levels of legally allowable copying.  In this section, we consider the socially 
optimal level of fair use, taking this reaction as given.  As a benchmark, we first derive 
the efficient dividing point between self-production (copying) and purchase of the 
original (assuming it is efficient for all consumers to consume the good).  Denoting this 
dividing point by z*, we write social welfare as 







c dzctzvdzzcvW .      (13) 
In this expression, the first term is consumers’ surplus from copying, while the second is 
the sum of the producer’s profit and consumers’ surplus from production and sale of the 
original.  Maximizing welfare with respect to z* yields the optimal threshold 




+ ,       (14) 
where z*<1 given cc>c.  Note that this point occurs precisely where the cost of copying 
equals the total cost (production plus transport) of consuming the original, or where 
ccz=p+(1-z)t.  (See Figure 8.)  Thus, the optimal threshold minimizes the total cost of 
production for each z. 
 Generally, this first-best outcome will not be achievable, however, because of the 
monopoly power granted to the author.  As a result, optimal fair use will maximize social 
welfare subject to the constraints that (1) the author sets his price to maximize profit, and 
(2) the author’s maximized profit must cover his fixed cost of creation.  To derive this 
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constrained welfare maximum, we will have to consider three cases.  Before proceeding, 
however, note that (14) and (4) imply that z*>zM if and only if 












 .      (15) 
Since this condition may or may not hold, z* may be larger or smaller than zM.8  This fact 
distinguishes case one from cases two and three. 
Case one:  z*<zM.  In this case, the first-best optimum is not attainable because 
the monopolist, by raising the price above marginal costs, overly limits the market for 
purchase. As a result, z  should be extended up to zM (i.e., Mzz =* ) in order to maximize 
the consumer surplus from copying.  This outcome is second-best because consumers in 
the range z∈[z*,zM] would be more efficiently served by purchasing from the author at 
the competitive price p=c than by making copies, but monopoly pricing by the author 
makes copying cheaper.  Extending fair use up to zM is therefore welfare-enhancing while 
being non-harmful to the author.  As a result, no infringement claims should occur in this 
case. 
 Case two:  z*>zM, and the author’s variable profit evaluated at *zz =  is at least 
as large as his fixed cost of creation, F.  In this case, the optimal level of fair use is 
** zz = , and the first-best outcome is achieved.  While copying in this range is harmful 
to the author, it does not reduce profit enough to deter creation.  Nevertheless, copyright 
holders may seek legal protection of their monopoly by challenging uses in this case.  
 Case three:  z*>zM, but the author’s variable profit at z* is less than F.  In this 
case, fair use should be set at the level zF  where π(zF)=F.  As a result,  zM< =*z zF<z*.  
Fair use falls short of the first best in this case because of the constraint that the author’s 
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profit must cover F.  Uses are especially threatening to copyright holders in this case, so 
they will likely meet with vigorous legal action. 
 As a final point, note from (8) and (14) that 




zz cc .     (16) 
Thus, optimal fair use will never occur in the range where zz ˆ≥ --that is, *z  will always 
be strictly less than z′ in Figures 6 and 7.  In other words, it is never efficient to set fair 
use in the range where it is non-binding on the author. 
 A numerical example illustrates the preceding analysis.  Let v=3, t=2, c=1, and 
cc=3.5.  The monopoly price and variable profit are thus pM=2 and πM=.5, while zM=.5.  
For z >zM, price is given by (9) and variable profit by (10).  As shown in Figures 6 and 7, 
profit is decreasing in z  until it reaches z′≈.829, at which point the price drops from 
p =2.66 to pˆ =2.25, and variable profit levels out at πˆ  =.284.  For this example, the first-
best threshold between copying and consumption of the original is z*=.667, which 
exceeds zM.  Thus, welfare is maximized at z  =.667 (the first-best outcome) if 
π =.443>F at this point (case two above).  However, if .443<F, then z  must be reduced 
until π =F (case three).  (Recall that we assumed πM>F.) 
4. Application of the Model to Copyright Law 
The law of fair use is based on Section 107 of the Copyright Act, which codified 
for the first time the factors determining fair use.  These factors are: (a) the purpose and 
character of the use, including whether such use is of commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes; (b) the nature of the copyrighted work; (c) the amount 
and substantiality of the material used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
8 Since the right-hand side of (15) is increasing in cc, the inequality is more likely to hold as cc declines. 
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(d) the effect of the use on a copyright owner’s potential market for and value of his 
work.9  Factor (a), the extent to which the use in question is commercial, and factor (d), 
the effect of the use on the value of the copyright, are both concerned with the role of 
copyright protection in promoting creation of original works. Further, since factor (b), the 
nature of the copyrighted work, has been interpreted by courts to afford greater protection 
to “creative” works,10 it also relates to this aspect of fair use.  Taken together, these 
factors represent the legal counterpart to the author’s profit constraint in the model.   
Factor (c) concerns the extent to which the use in question resembles the original 
work--uses that are closer to the original are less likely to be judged as fair.  This factor is 
captured in the model by the index z, which measures the “proximity” of the copy to the 
original.  Consistent with the law, the model defines fair use in terms of an optimally 
chosen threshold for z.  
The first important infringement case to apply these factors was Williams & 
Wilkins Co. v. United States,11 which was a claim by a publisher of medical journals that 
the unauthorized photocopying and dissemination of journal articles by government 
libraries was an infringement of its copyright.  The court found for the defendant, ruling 
that the use was fair. In reaching this result, the court emphasized the value of the copies 
in promoting scientific advancement rather than for commercial use, and the limited 
number of copies made.  Further, it noted that the plaintiffs offered little evidence of 
adverse financial effects.  These conclusions suggest that the use in question was welfare-
enhancing, while causing no harm to copyright holders. The court’s finding of fair use is 
                                                          
9 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
10 A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.Supp. 896, 913 (2000). 
11 487 F.2d 1345 (1973). 
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therefore consistent with the efficient standard as described by case two (or possibly even 
case one) of the model. 
A decade later, the Supreme Court re-examined the fair use standard in Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios,12 which alleged “contributory infringement” by the 
manufacturer of home video equipment that permitted unauthorized recording of 
copyrighted television programs.  In reversing an earlier appeals court decision against 
Sony, the Court held that the use in question was fair because it provided a clear benefit 
to consumers (the ability to “time-shift” programs), was non-commercial in nature, and 
imposed little if any harm on copyright holders.  Again, the use met the economic 
standard for fair use as prescribed by case two of the model. 
Williams & Wilkins, and to a lesser extent Sony, involved technologies where 
most uses were judged to be fair in the sense of enhancing welfare without substantially 
harming the copyright holder’s interests. Given this legal standard, Klein, Lerner, and 
Murphy (2002) question why plaintiffs and the court disagreed about the fair use 
standard, resulting in the unsuccessful legal challenges.  One explanation is that one or 
both of the parties erred in estimating the harm from a given use.  Another, favored by 
the authors (and consistent with case two of the model), is that some technologies allow 
both welfare-enhancing and harmful uses.  Thus, copyright holders reasonably file suit to 
protect their economic interests, but the court takes a broader view and judges as fair 
those uses that enhance social welfare.   
The court and plaintiffs agreed on the fair use standard, however, in the recent 
case of A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.13   The case concerned an internet service that 
                                                          
12 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984). 
13 114 F.Supp. 2d 896 (2000). 
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allowed consumers to download and share copyrighted music free of charge. In finding 
against fair use in this case, the court noted that the copies were identical to the originals, 
and, in contrast to the previous cases, were primarily for commercial rather than private 
use.  Further, it found that the copying adversely affected the economic interests of 
plaintiffs in at least two ways: by directly reducing the demand for their products, and by 
creating a barrier to entry into the market for digital downloading of music.14  The court 
therefore found the use to be an infringement of the plaintiffs’ copyright. 
In contrast to the earlier cases, Napster falls into case three of the model, where 
technological advancement permits uses that, while possibly welfare-enhancing, are so 
damaging to the copyright holder’s profit as to impair incentives to create the original.  
Indeed, the progression from Williams & Wilkins to Napster shows how technological 
change continually challenges the courts to re-define the optimal fair use standard.  In the 
early cases, technology was the limiting factor, permitting only uses that were beneficial 
while imposing little harm on copyright holders.  Efficiency clearly dictated that such 
uses be judged fair. However, continued improvements in technology have increased the 
threat to the value of the copyright--and hence the incentive to create original works--
ultimately forcing the court to set a limit on fair use.  In mirroring this progression, the 
three cases in the model reflect the evolutionary trend in fair use litigation.   
5. Conclusion 
 The analysis in this paper has highlighted the role of fair use in achieving an 
optimal balance between the incentive effects of copyright protection on one hand, and 
the distortions arising from the copyright holder’s monopoly power on the other.  By 
employing a differentiated product model, we were able to develop a threshold test for 
                                                          
14 114 F.Supp. 2d 896, 913 (2000). 
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fair use that closely resembled the sort of reasoning that courts actually use.  In this way, 
the model validates existing law.  Beyond that, the model underscores the role of 
technology in shaping the optimal fair use standard.  And as the Napster case illustrates, 
the emergence of technologies that permit both fair and infringing uses will only increase 
the role of the court in delineating the optimal scope of fair use. 
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